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IV.

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-(2)(k) (1953, as amended).
V.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

A. Whether Appellee, who materially breached a contractual
duty to direct and supervise the construction of Appellants'
residence, is entitled to damages under the construction contract
establishing such duty and setting the amount of compensation for
discharging such duty.
The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v.
Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
B. Whether Appellee, who breached the contract and was
justifiably discharged from the job, is entitled to maintain an
action against the non-breaching Appellant under a theory of unjust
enrichment to recover amounts he would have been entitled to under
the contract had he not breached or had he been unjustifiably
discharged.
The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v.
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Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
C. Whether

prejudgment

interest

is

recoverable

on

an

unliquidated award under a theory of quantum meruit or unjust
enrichment.
The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v.
Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
D. "Whether

post-judgment

interest

runs

from

the

date

judgment was entered or from the date the trial court granted
Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment.
The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v.
Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
E. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants their
attorney fees incurred in bringing a successful motion to dismiss
Appellee's cause of action to enforce the mechanic's lien and cause
of action for failure to obtain a construction bond.
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The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v.
Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
VI.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1992);
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 (1992);
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992);
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992).
The foregoing provisions are set forth in full in the
Addendum hereto.
VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal taken from the Third Judicial District
Court of Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson presiding.

The procedural history of the case is as

follows:
1.

On or about December 5, 1990, Appellee Bailey-Allen

Construction Company, Inc.1 filed a Complaint seeking to recover
payment for services he alleged to have rendered in contracting and
constructing Appellants' residence in Park City, Utah.

1

(R. 002).

For convenience, "Appellee" is used in this Brief to
designate Bailey-Allen Construction Company, Inc. and Richard
Allen, its president and the individual involved in this dispute.
54797
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The Complaint alleged causes of action for Breach of Contract,
Mechanic's Lien, Unjust Enrichment, and No Construction Bond.

(R.

001-008).
2.

On or about May 20, 1991, Appellants filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on Appellee's Second Cause of Action
(Mechanic's Lien), Third Cause of Action (Unjust Enrichment), and
Fourth Cause of Action (No Construction Bond).
3.

(R. 062-064).

On August 26, 1991, after hearing oral argument on

Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second,
Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the trial court entered a Minute
Entry granting Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
all three causes of action.
4.

(R. 106).

On September 12, 1991, Appellants' attorney filed an

Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, itemizing the attorney fees
involved
Judgment.

in bringing

Appellants' Motion

for

Partial

Summary

(R. 111-114) . At the same time, Appellants submitted to

the trial court a draft Judgment proposing to dismiss the three
causes of action on which the trial court granted summary judgment
and to grant Appellants their attorney fees and costs incurred in
bring the Motion.
5.

(R. 110; 125-26).

On September 16, 1991, Appellee filed an Objection

to Proposed Judgment in which Appellee objected to the amount of
attorney fees requested by Appellants.
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(R. 116-17).

6.

Appellants submitted a Response to

[Appellee's]

Objection to Proposed Judgment on September 18, 1991 (R. 122-23),
contending that an award of fees and costs were proper under the
Mechanic's Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, and the Bond
Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2, and that the amount requested was
reasonable since most of counsel's time on the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was spent on those causes of action.
7.

(R.123).

On September 24, 1991, the trial court granted

summary judgment on Appellee's claims for Unjust Enrichment,
Mechanic's Lien and Construction Bond, and ordered that the mechanic's lien be discharged.

(R. 127-28).

The court reserved Appel-

lants' request for attorneys' fees and costs under the Mechanic's
Lien statute for future determination.
8.

(R. 128).

Appellee's remaining cause of action for breach of

contract was tried to the bench on December 18 and 19, 1991 and on
January 30, 1992.
9.

(R. 305).

During the trial, the court stated that it had erred

in dismissing the cause of action for unjust enrichment and it
reinstated

the

objection.

(R. 543-45).
10.

cause

of

action

sua

sponte

over Appellants'

At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued its

ruling from the bench, awarding Appellee damages and directing
Appellants to submit Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment.
54797
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11.

On or about March 12, 1992, Appellee filed a Motion

to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions and Judgment.

(R. 171).

Appellants' counsel advised the court that it had not yet received
the transcript of trial and could not prepare the findings,
conclusions and judgment without the transcripts.
12.

(R. 178) .

Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings,

Conclusions and Judgment was granted on April 17, 1992.
13.

(R.182).

Appellants filed a Notice of Substitution of Counsel

on May 20, 1992, (R. 184A) , and submitted proposed findings,
conclusions and judgment on or about May 27, 1992.
14.

(R. 187).

Appellee filed Objections to the Proposed Findings,

Conclusion and Judgment on July 6, 1992 (R. 204) , and a hearing was
held on August 28, 1992, on Appellee's Objections.
court entered judgment on October 7, 1992.
15.

(R. 213). The

(R. 220).

On October 19, 1992, Appellants filed a Motion to

Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
16.

On November 24, 1992, Appellee served a Writ of

Execution on Appellant.
17.

(R. 266).

(R. 272).

On December 8, 1992, upon a joint motion of Appellee

and Appellant, the court issued an order staying execution of the
judgment, authorizing Appellant to pay the judgment into court, and
determining that said payment was adequate security of Appellee
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pending the determination of Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend
the Judgment and pending the appeal of this matter.
18.

Appellants' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

was denied on January 14, 1993.
19.
1993.

(R. 279).

(R. 288).

Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on February 12,

(R. 294).
VIII.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Except where noted, the following Statement of Relevant
Facts is taken from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
adopted by the trial court.

See Addendum A.

Appellants do not

dispute the Findings of Fact, but they do contend that the trial
court erred in its Conclusions of Law.
On or about July 3, 1990, Appellants and Appellee entered
into a contract whereby Appellee agreed to act as the general
contractor and to oversee the construction of Appellant's residence
in Park City, Utah.

(R. 214-15) .

The contract provided, among

other things, that Appellee would provide evidence of adequate
insurance coverage for the construction project, that he would act
as the general contractor, and that he would supervise and direct
the construction.

(R. 214-15).

In return, Appellants agreed to

pay all costs of labor and material including $22 per hour for
Appellee's own hands-on labor, and pay Appellee $100,000 for
directing and supervising the construction.

54797
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Id.

At the time the contract was signed, Appellee represented to
Appellant that he had $1,000,000 in liability insurance in force,
(R. 215)• He failed, however, to provide evidence of such insurance as required by the contract.

Id.

Appellee later discovered

that his policy was for only $300,000 coverage and that it had been
cancelled

on October 24, 1989, nearly

two years before the

Appellant and Appellee entered into the contract.

(R. 215-16).

Appellants notified Appellee on July 20, 1990 that Appellee had not
yet

provided

the

necessary

certificate

evidencing

insurance

coverage and that Appellants required such evidence under the terms
of the contract.

(R. 216). As of October 2, 1990, Appellee still

had not provided a certificate of insurance.

(R. 348-50, Testimony

of Appellee, Richard Allen).
At the time Appellee entered into the contract, he was aware
that Appellants

had

experienced

problems

contractors

had

terminated

two

and

unsatisfactory performance.

(R. 215).

with

general

prior

general

contractors

for

Appellee was also aware

that Appellants were meticulous and demanding individuals and would
require exacting performance of the contract.

Id.

On or about October 2, 1990, Appellants terminated Appellee
from the construction project for Appellee's failure to obtain
insurance as required by the contract, and his failure to adequately direct and supervise the construction.

(R. 216). Appellee

filed a mechanic's lien, brought an action to foreclose the lien
54797
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and an action for failure to obtain a construction bond, and sought
to recover damages under the contract and under a theory of unjust
enrichment for the $100,000 fee for directing and supervising the
construction.

(R. 001-008, Complaint).

On September 24, 1991, the trial court granted summary
judgment on Appellee's claims for Unjust Enrichment, Mechanic's
Lien and Construction Bond, and ordered that the mechanic's lien be
discharged.

(R. 127-28, Order of Partial Summary Judgment).

The contract claim was tried to the bench on December 18 and
19, 1991 and on January 30, 1992.

(R. 305, Reporter's Transcript

of Trial Proceedings ("Trial Transcript")). During the trial, the
court, sua sponte. reinstated the cause of action for Unjust
Enrichment

over

Appellants'

objection.

(R.

543-45,

Trial

Transcript).
At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued its ruling
from the bench.

(R. 797-806, Trial Transcript).

Pursuant to the

court's instructions, Appellants' submitted Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter "Proposed Findings and
Conclusions" (R. 187-92), and a Proposed Judgment based on the
court's verbal ruling.

(R. 193-94).

Appellee filed an Objection

to Appellants' Proposed Findings and Conclusions (R. 204-07), and
on August 28, 1992, a hearing was held on Appellee's Objections to
the Proposed Findings and Conclusions (R. 213).
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On October 7, 1992, the trial court adopted Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and entered Judgment.

(R. 214-22) .

The

court determined that a written contract existed between Appellee
and Appellants; that although the written contract was ambiguous
and incomplete as drafted, it could be interpreted as written; and
that the court would look on it as an oral contract,

(R. 217).

The trial court found that, under the contract, Appellee had
a

duty

to

promptly

provide

insurance, but did not.

evidence

(R. 217) .

of

adequate

liability

The court concluded that

Appellee's failure to provide evidence of adequate insurance was a
material breach of the contract and that Appellants were justified
in terminating Appellee's services for that breach.

Id.

The trial court also found that Appellee failed to meet his
obligation to oversee the construction.

(R. 217). The trial court

concluded that Appellants were justified in terminating Appellee
from the job because Appellee did not give the construction project
the kind of attention Appellee knew it would require under the
contract.

(R. 217).

The trial court concluded that Appellants were not in breach
of the contract in any way.

(R. 218) .

Nevertheless, the court

awarded Appellee damages "in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment,

54797
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based on the contract..."2

(R. 218). It found that about 10% of

the construction project had been completed while Appellee was
general contractor.

(R. 216) . Based on that percentage, the court

determined that Appellants had received a benefit from Appellee's
pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000 "regardless of
whether [Appellee] performed its duties under the contract."

(R.

216) .
The trial court concluded that Appellee was entitled to
receive $15,500 from defendant Appellants, "$10,000 representing
1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for services in completing
1/10

of the construction, and

$5,500 for services involving

negotiations for the purchase of lumber."

(R. 218).

After

calculating offsets for amounts owed by Appellee to Appellant for
faulty construction of a retaining wall and staircase, and for
unnecessary materials, the net judgment against Appellants, before
interest, was $11,141.00.

(R. 218-19).

2

For the purposes of this Brief "unjust enrichment" and
"quantum meruit" are used interchangeably. Under Utah law, "quasicontract" or "unjust enrichment" is the branch of "quantum meruit"
allowing a contract to be implied in law and permitting a legal
action in restitution. Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah
App. 1987). Quantum meruit encompasses unjust enrichment. In the
present case, there seems to be no reason for any distinction
between the phrases.
Also, for the sake of simplicity, the term "damages" is used
in this Brief to mean the award of money to Appellee (exclusive of
interest and offsets) regardless of whether such amount was awarded
pursuant to the contract or under a theory of unjust enrichment.
54797
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Pre-judgment interest was awarded at the rate of ten percent
(10%) per annum,

from November 1, 1990, the date Appellants

terminated Appellee's services, to April 17, 1992, the date the
trial court granted Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment.

(R. 219).

The court assessed post-judgment interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, from and after April 17, 1992, the
date the trial court granted Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment.

(R. 219). Judgment was entered

October 7, 1992. Id.
On October 19, 1992, Appellants filed a Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

(R. 266) . Appellants moved the court to vacate

the award of damages and interest, and to grant Appellants their
attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing their successful
motion for summary judgment on Appellee's cause of action to
foreclose the mechanic's lien.

.Id. The Motion to Alter or Amend

the Judgment was denied on January 13, 1993.
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(R. 288).

IX.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellee was not entitled to damages under the contract
because he failed to perform under the contract.

Under Utah law,

in order to recover on a contract, "a contractor must first
establish his own performance." Nielsen v. Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514
(Utah 1980).

In the present case, the trial court specifically

found that Appellee did not perform under the provision of contract
requiring him to direct and supervise the construction.

(R. 217) .

Because Appellee failed to perform the duties on which payment was
contingent, the court's ruling was error insofar as it was based on
the contract.
Similarly, the court erred in awarding Appellee any recovery
on its claim for unjust enrichment. Under Utah law, with only very
few exceptions that are not applicable here, an award for unjust
enrichment is prohibited when an enforceable contract exists.
Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah App.
1992); Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d 264, 268

(Utah App. 1987).

Moreover, it was inappropriate for the court to conclude that
Appellee conferred any benefit on Appellants.

While 10% of the

construction may have been completed during the period of time that
Appellee was general contractor, Appellee did not cause that
construction to be completed.

In fact, the court found that

Appellee failed to perform his duty in supervising the construction.
54797
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valid contract exists, and in view of the court's ruling that
Appellee failed to properly perform his duties as general contractor, it was error to award Appellee anything under a theory of
unjust enrichment.
Assuming, arguendo, that an award of damages was proper, the
trial court erred in awarding Appellee prejudgment interest.
Prejudgment interest is warranted only when the amount of damages
is certain from the time of loss.

Shoreline Development, Inc. v.

Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. May 19, 1992) . In equity
cases, prejudgment interest is generally not available because the
amount of damages cannot be calculated with any certainty.

Id.

(citing Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991)) . In the
present case, the amount the court awarded was unliquidated at the
time of loss.

(R. 128) .

It was error, therefore, to award

prejudgment interest.
Assuming,

arguendo,

that

an

award

of

damages

was

appropriate, the trial court also erred in awarding Appellee postjudgment interest from the date that it granted Appellee's Motion
to Compel Filing of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Utah
law clearly holds that post-judgment interest runs from the date
judgment is entered. Utah R. of Civ. P. 54(e) (1992); Utah R. App.
P. 32 (1993) .
Finally,

the

trial

court

erred

in

failing

to

award

Appellants their attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing their

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Appellee's causes of action
based on the Mechanic's Lien Statute and on the Construction Bond
Statute.

The provision at Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 mandates that

the successful party be awarded its reasonable attorney fees in an
action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The court has discretion to
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action
for failure to obtain a construction bond. Utah Code Ann. § 14-22(3).

In the present case, Appellants' timely and properly

requested such fees and costs. The trial court failed to determine
the proper amount of fees and failed to award fees to Appellants
for prevailing on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with
respect to the Second and Fourth Causes of Action.
Appellants, therefore, petition this Court to vacate the
award of damages to Appellee, vacate the award of prejudgment and
post-judgment interest, and to remand the case to the trial court
with instructions to award Appellants their attorney fees and costs
incurred in successfully pursuing their Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
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X.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO APPELLEE.

The trial court misapplied the law when it awarded
Appellee damages and interest.

A valid, enforceable contract

existed, and because Appellee breached

the contract, it was

improper to award Appellee damages under the contract.

The

relationship of the parties was governed by the contract, and it
was, therefore, improper to grant relief under a theory of unjust
enrichment. There was simply no legal basis for the trial court's
decision in this case.
1.

The Trial Court's Award of Damages to Appellee Was
Improperly Based on Both the Contract and on a
Theory of Unjust Enrichment.

The trial court's error in awarding damages stemmed from
its finding that Appellee was in material breach of the contract
while, at the same time, allowing Appellee to recover the amount
that he would have been entitled to under the contract had he not
breached.

Because the court found that Appellee breached the

contract and Appellant did not, it was left without a basis for an
award of damages on the contract.

The trial court, thus, awarded

money to Appellee "based on the contract" and on a cause of action
for unjust enrichment that the court had dismissed and then
reinstated on its own initiative.

(R. 218; 543-44) . The resulting

decision was a cryptic blend of legal theories.
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Ruling from the bench, the court unequivocally found that
Appellee had breached the contract.

It stated:

[Appellant's] testimony was that the contract
was terminated because of the insurance. I
think it is a major factor and I think he had
the right to terminate the contract on that.

And I think there were differences that
began to arise as far as the attitude of being
on the job, taking care of things right now,
getting things done, seeing that they were
done, seeing things were moving along, answering the questions, which the plaintiffs were
not performing as far as the contract was
concerned.
Therefore the court does find that the
plaintiff did breach the contract and that the
defendant was justified in terminating the
relationship, terminating the contract.
(R. 801). Having thus found, the court vaguely stated its reason
for awarding damages:
Now the question comes up as to unjust
enrichment. . . .
The court accepts the
testimony of the architect and believes that
. . . that is the best, most reliable testimony as far as the contract is concerned.
And of course his testimony was that
approximately 25% of the job was completed,
15% of it was completed at the time . . . when
the plaintiff's commenced working and of
course he said "less than 10%." Counsel did
not tie him down to a figure; therefore, this
court is going to accept the figure of 10% and
find that . . . the plaintiffs are entitled to
10% of the amount of the contract.
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(R. 801-03) .

This language suggests that the court awarded

Appellee a recovery in unjust enrichment.
The trial court ordered that Appellant's prepare the
findings of fact and conclusions of law and submit them to Appellee
for approval.

(R. 806).

The trial court's imprecise ruling,

however, created a problem as to whether the court had awarded
Appellee damages under the contract or whether it had granted
relief for unjust enrichment.

Appellants' proposed Findings and

Conclusions stated that the trial court had based the award on a
theory of unjust enrichment.

(R. 191). Appellee objected to the

proposed finding limiting recovery to a quantum meruit theory of
law.

(R. 204) .

The parties presented oral argument on the

proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the trial
court, again ruling from the bench, stated as follows:
. . . the unjust enrichment, there is no
question that this was a case based on the
contract, that there was unjust enrichment,
but it was a contract, which they entered
into, which was not a complete contract, which
this Court based an award on. So this is not
only an unjust enrichment theory, it was also
based on a contract which the parties had
entered into.
(R. 213, Reporter's Partial Transcript of Hearing on Objections to
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment:
Court's Ruling, at pp. 2-3).
In an attempt to articulate the trial court's ruling in
writing, Appellee and Appellants' counsel finally agreed on the
54797

-18-

following language which was incorporated into the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law:
8.
The Court finds, that about 10% of the
construction was completed while plaintiff was
general contractor and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from plaintiff's pre-termination services in the amount
of $10,000 regardless of whether plaintiff
performed its duties under the contract.
(R. 217, Findings of Fact)(emphasis added).
4.
The court concludes that plaintiff's
failure to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a material
breach of the contract.
6.
The Court concludes that defendants were
justified in terminating plaintiff's services
because plaintiff spent very few hours on the
job site and did not give the construction
project the attention that it required under
the contract and that plaintiff knew Mr.
Kurzet would expect.
•

. . .

8.
With respect to Appellees' Unjust Enrichment Claim, the Court has considered
several alternative methods of calculating any
award to Appellee under such a theory. The
Court concludes the most logical basis to be
the percentage of Appellants' residence that
was completed during the period Appellee was
on the job.
10. The Court concludes that Appellee is
entitled to receive $15,500 from defendant in
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the
contract between Appellee and Appellants,
$10,000 representing l/10th of the contract
price of $100,000 for services in completing
l/10th of the construction and $5,500 for
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber.
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(R. 214, 218).

Based on the foregoing, the trial court awarded

$15,500 in damages to Appellee less offsets for repairs to the
retaining wall and stairs and for unnecessary materials.

(R.

218-19).
The parties had an enforceable contract and Appellee, not
Appellants, materially breached the contract. Having breached the
contract, Appellee was not entitled to damages based on the
contract. And, because a valid contract existed, Appellee was not
entitled to an award in quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.

By

relying on both the contract and on a theory of unjust enrichment,
the trial court sowed seeds of confusion and error and, ultimately,
reached the wrong result.

As demonstrated below, there were no

grounds, either under the contract or in quantum meruit, for an
award to Appellee.
2.

Appellee is Not Entitled to Damages On the Contract.

The trial court correctly found that Appellee breached
the contract in two respects.

First, Appellee failed to provide

evidence of adequate insurance.

The contract provided for it (R.

10) , Appellant said he had $1 million in coverage when, in fact, he
did not (R. 215-16).

Even after Appellants notified Appellee of

the deficiency, Appellee failed to obtain coverage and provide
evidence thereof.
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In addition to failing to provide adequate evidence of
insurance, the trial court found that Appellee failed to spend
adequate time on the project and failed to give the project the
attention required to properly direct and supervise the construction.

(R. 217) . That finding was well supported by the record.

Appellee was rarely on the construction site. Appellants' payment
records showed that the time Appellee spent on hands-on labor over
a period of more than two months, from July 9, 1990 through
September 15, 1990, amounted to only 60.5 hours.

(R. 81, 84).

The construction that Appellee did supervise was often
substandard. Under his supervision, a retaining wall was built out
of square with the house (R. 436) , a flight of concrete stairs was
improperly placed
ordered.

(R. 713-14), and unnecessary materials were

(R. 219; 721) . The cost of correcting those mistakes was

found to be $1,800 for the wall, $2,000 for the stairs and $559 for
the unnecessary materials.

(R. 805; 218-19).

Appellee knew that Appellants would be very demanding and
meticulous about the construction, and that they would require
exacting performance of the contract.

(R. 215). Yet, the court

found that Appellee was "very flippant in his attitude as far as
the job was concerned," and that his flippant attitude "was
conveyed to the defendant throughout the course of this contract."
(R. 799).

Differences between Appellee and Appellants arose

concerning Appellee's "attitude of being on the job," Appellee's
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attention to "getting things done, . . . seeing things were moving
along," and his availability to answer questions about the project.
(R. 801). The trial court observed that, given the size of the
project and the amount of compensation Appellee was to receive
under the contract, the project deserved closer attention than the
Appellee gave it.

(R. 798) . The court concluded that Appellee was

"not performing as far as the contract was concerned."

(R. 801).

"The rule in Utah is that to recover on a contract, a
contractor must first establish his own performance [or] a valid
excuse for his failure to perform." Nielsen v. Wang, 613 P.2d 512,
514 (Utah 1980).

A breaching party cannot enforce a contract

against a non-breaching party. Id. ; see also. Liddle v. Petty. 816
P.2d 1066, 1068 (Mont. 1991) (if one contracting party materially
breaches

the contract

the other

is entitled

to suspend his

performance); Parsons Supply. Inc. v. Smith. 591 P.2d 821, 823
(Wash App. 1978) (a breaching party cannot demand performance from
nonbreaching party).
Having breached the provision of the contract on which
the $100,000 payment was contingent, Appellee was not entitled to
enforce it against Appellants.

For the same reason, contrary to

the trial court's decision, Appellee was not entitled to recover
under the contract $5,500 for "negotiating the purchase of lumber."
(R. 218). Appellee testified at trial that shortly after he had
begun his work as the contractor on the construction project, he
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took an inventory of lumber that had been ordered by a previous
contractor but had not yet been paid for by Appellants.

(R. 748) .

Appellants had planned to pay $28,000 for the lumber.

Id.

Appellee testified that he recommended to Appellants that they pay
only $22,500 for the lumber instead of $28,000, and that Appellants
were ultimately successful in purchasing the lumber for the lower
price, a savings of $5,500. (R. 748-49).
Under the contract, Appellee was required to "obtain
competitive bids for services and materials."

(R.010).

Assuming

there was any savings as a result of Appellee's negotiation,3
Appellee was not entitled to compensation for having advised
Appellants and saved them money on the purchase of lumber.

That

was merely one of the services Appellee was required to render
under the contract. The fact that he may have performed some tasks
in fulfillment of his supervisory duty does not excuse a material
breach of that duty.

Certainly, it does not entitle Appellee to

receive in damages the amount that he saved Appellants in expenses
when it was part of his job to purchase materials at an economic
price.
The trial court erred in granting Appellee relief under
the contract because, as the court determined, Appellee did not

3

The record contains no proof that such savings were
realized.
For the purposes of this Brief, however, Appellants
assume that the savings occurred because the trial court so
determined. (R. 216).
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perform under the contract.4 This Court, therefore, should vacate
the award of damages insofar as it is based on the contract.
3•

Appellee Is Not Entitled to Any Recovery On Its
Claim for Unjust Enrichment.

Under Utah law, an award for unjust enrichment is inappropriate when an enforceable contract exists.

See, Karapanos v.

Boardwalk Fries. Inc. . 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah App. 1992) (Appellee
not entitled to recover franchising fee under theory of unjust
enrichment when enforceable franchising agreement exists).

The

Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "[r]ecovery under quantum
meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract
exists."

Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah

App. 1987).

The rationale for resorting to a quantum meruit theory is that
there is no contract yet there is some benefit that has been

4

Assuming for the sake of argument that somehow plaintiff
could have been entitled to enforce the contract despite the
breach, the trial court still would have erred in awarding damages
because Appellee didn't prove his damages. Under Utah law, if a
plaintiff cannot prove the fact of damages with reasonable
certainty, he is not entitled to any. Sawyers v. F.M.A. Leasing
Co. , 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986).
Atkin Wright & Miles v.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah
1985) (standard of proof required for establishing the fact of
damages is greater than that required for establishing the amount).
The damages recoverable by a contractor under a construction
contract are "the total amount promised for the project, less the
reasonable costs of completing it." Holman v. Sorenson. 556 P.2d
499, 500 (Utah 1976). Appellants expended considerable sums to
finish the job and to correct Appellee's unacceptable work after
Appellee was terminated from his employment. Appellee failed to
put on any evidence of the reasonable costs of completing the
project and to prove the fact of damages with any reasonable degree
of certainty.
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conferred. Id.

at 268. In the absence of an express contract, the

theory allows a contract to be implied either in law or in fact.
Id.
There are very few exceptions to the rule.

When an

express construction contract exists, Utah courts have suggested
that recovery in quantum meruit is proper only under extraordinary
circumstances. When the work performed is very different from the
work

described

in the

construction

contract,

it may become

reasonable to imply a contract that covers the additional work.
Under such circumstances, an award of recovery in quantum meruit
may be appropriate.

But see. Highland Construction Co. v. Union

Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (Court denied
recovery in quantum meruit because Appellee contractor failed to
prove in what respects the work performed differed from the work
contemplated by the contract).

In the present case, Appellee has

not claimed, nor does the evidence show that any of the work
Appellee performed fell outside the scope of contract.
Quantum meruit may also be applicable when a contractor
justifiably ceases work or is unjustifiably terminated.
Davies, 683 P.2d at 1048 (dicta).

See.

In the present case, the trial

court expressly determined that Appellant was justified in terminating Appellee. The instant case does not present a set of facts
that would allow recovery in quantum meruit in the face of a valid
contract.
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Assuming for the sake of argument that, contrary to the
trial court's ruling, no enforceable contract existed, it still
would

have

been

enrichment.

To

error

to

recover

plaintiff must demonstrate:

award

in an

Appellee
action

anything

for unjust

in

unjust

enrichment,

(1) that defendant received a benefit;

(2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit;
(3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant
to retain the benefit without paying for it." Davies v. Olsen, 746
P.2d at 269.
conferred."

The measure of recovery is "the value of the benefit
.Id. The purpose of quantum meruit is "to prevent the

defendant's enrichment at the plaintiff's expense." Id. (citations
omitted) .

Of course, the theory presupposes

that

it was the

plaintiff who conferred the benefit on the defendant.
In the present case, the trial court's rationale for
awarding damages was that, because ten percent of the construction
project was completed while Appellee was the general contractor,
Appellants

received

a benefit

from Appellee's

pre-termination

services "regardless of whether Appellee performed its duties under
the contract."

(R. 216).

The ruling is self-contradictory.

If

Appellee didn't perform, then Appellee conferred no benefit.
The court relied on the testimony of an architectural
draftsman to determine that 10% of the work was completed between
early July and the end of September, the time period that Appellee
was supposed to be acting as general contractor.
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(R. 803).

In

focusing on the percentage that was completed, the court ignored
the fact that Appellee was not responsible for completing it. The
court stated:
Now a lot is said that they [Appellee]
should not be entitled even to that amount,
because of their not being on the job and not
answering the questions.
And that might be, except for the fact
that even if they were not there, and were not
able to answer questions, the architect did
testify that there had been 10% work accomplished, and therefore the defendant had been
enriched by that amount.
(R. 803) (emphasis added) .

The court concluded that even if

Appellee could not be credited with causing 10% of the construction
to be completed, the very fact that it was completed entitled
Appellee to 10% of the amount provided for in the contract.
Appellants may have been enriched, but it was not unjustly.

The

record demonstrates that it was not Appellee who enriched them.
Appellee had a contractual duty to select bids for
services and materials.

(R. 010).

Mr. Kurzet testified that,

before Appellee was hired as the general contractor, Appellants had
already selected a carpenter and contractor, Andrew Parker, to
frame the house.

(R. 599) .

Appellee was given the "option" to

hire Mr. Parker as the framer, but if Appellee had not selected
Parker, Appellants would not have hired Appellee.

(R. 599-600) .

In other words, Appellee had to accept Appellants' choice of
framers. Similarly, Appellee had no discretion in hiring the mason
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who was selected solely by Appellants.

(R. 601). After Appellee

was terminated from the job, Mr. Parker continued to work on the
project as the general contractor and was still employed by
Appellants at the time this matter was tried.

(R. 598-601).

The testimony at trial suggested that Appellee was only
minimally instrumental, not only in selecting the subcontractors,
but in supervising the project.

Architectural draftsman, Stanley

Johnson, testified that he was involved in the design, drafting and
construction of Appellants' residence and, as part of his responsibilities in that regard, made periodic inspections of the structure
and met with the workmen.

(R. 666, 671) . Mr. Johnson met with Mr.

Parker and the mason on a regular basis, at least once or twice a
week from July through September.

(R. 676) .

During the same

period of time, he met with Appellee between four and ten times.
Id.

Moreover, Mr. Johnson testified that the progress that

occurred on the structure during that time period consisted of
building the stone chimneys and framing the first three floors,
accomplishments of the framer and mason.

(R. 677).

Mr. Kurzet testified that Mr. Parker was responsible for
working out design changes with the architect and for avoiding
delays in the construction due to such changes.

(R. 513) .

Although Mr. Parker tried to keep Appellee apprised of the process,
Appellee was not present on a day-to-day basis and it was Mr.
Parker who "grabbed the ball and ran with it."
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Id.

Mr. Parker

testified that almost every afternoon after work he went to the
architect's office to discuss problems that had arisen with the
construction.

(R. 700) . Appellee was not present at any of those

meetings between Mr. Parker and the architect (R. 700-01), and Mr.
Parker estimated that Appellee was seldom at the job site for more
than about one half hour each day.

(R. 695) . In fact# Mr. Parker

testified that had Appellee never been present at all, the framing
would have been accomplished and the rate of construction would not
have slowed.

(R. 710) .

The record in this case shows that Appellee did little to
contribute toward the progress in the construction of Appellants'
residence that took place between July and September of 1990.
Appellee was fairly paid for the work that he did; every invoice
that Appellee submitted to Appellants was paid, including those for
Appellee's own labor.

(R. 93, Affidavit of Richard Allen; R. 81-

85, Exhibit to Affidavit of Stanley M. Kurzet (showing itemization
of labor costs paid)).
completed

during

If ten percent of the construction was

that period,

it was not due

to Appellee's

services, but to the efforts of others. Even the trial court seems
to have recognized that Appellants were not unjustly enriched by
Appellee when it ruled that Appellee did not give the project the
attention it deserved.
The award of unjust enrichment should be vacated because
such an award is not allowed under Utah law when there is a valid
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contract, and because Appellee's services were not of significant
benefit to Appellants.
B.

THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE AWARD TO
APPELLEE OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial
court concluded that Appellee was entitled to prejudgment interest
at the rate of 10% per annum from the date Appellants terminated
Appellee's services to April 17, 1992, the date the trial court
granted Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions
and Judgment.

The award of prejudgment interest is error and

should be vacated.
An award of prejudgment interest on an unjust enrichment
award is contrary to law. Under Utah law, an award of prejudgment
interest is warranted only when the amount of damages is certain
from the time of loss. Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County,
835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. May 19, 1992) . The Utah Supreme Court
has stated that where damages cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy, prejudgment interest is not recoverable.

Biork v.

April Indus. . Inc. . 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) , cert, denied 431
U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245.

In order for damages to

mathematically certain, they must be ascertained
in accordance with the fixed rules of evidence
and known standards of value, which the court
or jury must follow in fixing the amount,
rather than be guided by their best judgment
in assessing the amount to be allowed for past
as well as for future injury, or for elements
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that cannot be measured by any fixed standard
of value.
Price-Orem v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnel 1, 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah
App. 1989) (quoting Fell v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 32 Utah
101, 88 P. 1003, 1005 (1907)).
In equity cases, damages often cannot be calculated with
mathematical certainty, thus prejudgment interest on an award in
equity is generally not allowed under Utah law.
Development,

the plaintiff

appealed

a

interest on an unjust enrichment award.

denial

In Shoreline
of

prejudgment

The plaintiff contended

that because an unjust enrichment claim is similar to a contract
claim, prejudgment interest should have been awarded. The Court of
Appeals observed that the determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is not the nature of the claim; it is "whether the
damages upon which prejudgment interest is sought can be calculated
with mathematical certainty."

Id. at 211.5 The Court noted that,

5

There are numerous cases in support of this proposition.
E.g. Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State. 552 P.2d 107, 108-09
(Utah 1976) (amount due under the contract was ascertainable by
calculation); Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1225
(Utah Adv. 1990) ("A court can award pre-judgment interest only
when the loss is fixed at a particular time and the amount can be
fixed with accuracy."); Biork v. April Indus., Inc.. 560 P.2d 315,
317 (Utah) cert, denied. 431 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct. 2634 (1977) (where
damages cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy the amount
of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact
and pre-judgment interest is not allowed); Fell v. Union Pacific
Ry. Co.. 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1006 (1907) ("in all . . . cases
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the
province of the jury to assess at the time of trial, no interest is
permissible.") .
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because an award in equity is based on the amount by which one is
unjustly enriched, it is less likely to admit of mathematical
certainty. Prejudgment interest, therefore, is generally precluded
in equity claims.

Jd. (citing Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089,

1097 (Utah 1991)).
Even

though

prejudgment

interest

is

generally

not

recoverable in an equity claim, a plaintiff is not denied an
remedy.

A plaintiff may claim lost interest as part of damages.

Shoreline Development, at 29 (citing Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White
Superior Co. . 546 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1976) .
articulated the rule:

The Court clearly

" [P]rejudgment interest must be sought

directly as damages in unjust enrichment cases, if at all."

Id.

(emphasis added).
In the present case, the trial court stated that it based
the amount on the contract.

But the underlying rationale for the

award of damages was the unsupported conclusion that Appellants
received a benefit from Appellee's services. The trial court found
that "approximately" ten percent of the work had been completed
based on the architect's testimony of "less than ten percent,"
although the court noted that "counsel did not tie him down to a
figure."

(R. 803).
There was no argument nor even any suggestion by either

party that the amount of the award was ascertainable from the time
of the alleged loss.
54797
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that the amount was not ascertainable.

(R. 299, Reporter's

Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Scheduling Conference at pp. 12-15) .

Part of the basis for the

court's granting Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
the Mechanic's Lien cause of action was that the sum that Appellee
claimed was owed him for supervisory services was unliquidated.
Id.

The court found that Appellee "had no right to file a

mechanic's lien against [Appellants'] property for an unliquidated
sum."

(R. 128, Order of Partial Summary Judgment).
As discussed above, the amount of damages in this case

was determined by approximating the value of the construction that
was completed while Appellee was the general contractor.

The

amount of unjust enrichment could not have been calculated with
mathematical certainty, either at the time of loss or at the moment
of judgment because it depended on the trial court's sense of
equity

in

compensating

for

a

benefit

supposedly

conferred.

Prejudgment interest is contrary to law and the award should be
vacated.
C.

THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE AWARD OF POST-JUDGMENT
INTEREST.

The Court should amend the judgment to vacate the award
of post-judgment interest because, as discussed above, Appellee is
not entitled to recovery either under the contract or, under a
theory of unjust enrichment. Assuming, arguendo, that an award of
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post-judgment interest had been appropriate, post-judgment interest
should run from the date judgment was entered.

Utah R. Civ. P.

54(e); see also, Utah R. App. P. 32 (1993) ("Unless otherwise
provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from
the date the judgment was entered in the trial court") (emphasis
added) .
The trial court awarded post-judgment interest on $11,141
at the rate of 12% per annum from and after April 17, 1992. (R.
219).

The court reasoned that because Appellee prevailed on its

Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions and Judgment,
Appellee should recover post-judgment interest from the date the
trial court granted the Motion. Presumably, the trial court meant
to penalize Appellants for delaying the date that judgment was
finally entered.6
Rule 54(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that interest on a judgment runs "from the time it was rendered."
Although the rule does not state that a judgment is rendered upon

6

During the same period of time, however, Appellants were
involved in retaining new counsel and delay was inevitable. (R.
184A, Notice of Substitution of Counsel, May 20, 1992). Appellants' new counsel promptly filed the pleading. Appellee has not
sought sanctions for delay or alleged any impropriety in that
respect and it would have been inappropriate for the trial court to
penalize Appellants by awarding post-judgment interest from the
date the Motion to Compel was granted.
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the date that it is "entered", such an interpretation is compelled
under the law of Utah and other jurisdictions.
Most jurisdictions hold that interest on a judgment
accrues from the date the judgment is entered.

The rationale is

that the date of entry is the date damages become liquidated. The
Washington Court of Appeals has articulated the majority view. In
National Steel Construction Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance
Co. of Pittsburgh, 543 P.2d 642 (Wash. App. 1975) , Appellee was
awarded damages against an insurance company for its failure to
accept a tender of defense in a product's liability case.

The

court awarded interest from the date of its oral decision fixing
the amount of damages, rather than the date judgment was entered.
The Washington Court of Appeals found it was error to impose
interest "from the date of the court's oral decision rather than
from the date the judgment was entered.
stated:

Id. at 644.

The court

"While it may be argued that those fees and costs became

liquidated when the court announced its ruling, a trial judge's
oral ruling is always subject to change prior to entry of a final
judgment.

Accordingly, it is the entry of judgment and not the

oral decision that accomplishes a liquidation of the damages for
attorney's fees."

Id. at 644-45 (citations omitted).7

Before

See also Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp. 754 P.2d
984 (Utah App. 1985) (post-judgment interest runs from date of entry
of new judgment, not from date of previous erroneous judgment) ;
(continued...)
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judgment is entered, a decision is subject to modification, the
amount

of damages

is not

therefore, is inappropriate.

certain, and

interest

on damages,

Id.

As discussed above, there was substantial controversy
over the measure of damages that should be applied in this case.
The trial court specifically found that the sums owed to Appellee
were unliquidated when Appellee filed the mechanic's lien (R. 127,
Order of Partial Summary Judgment), and they remained unliquidated
until the court entered judgment.
Because Utah law fixes the date of entry of judgment as
the date on which post-judgment interest begins to run, the trial
court's award of post-judgment interest from the date it granted
Appellee's Motion to Compel should be vacated.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD
ATTORNEY PEES AND COSTS IN CONNECTION
WITH APPELLANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON APPELLEE'S MECHANIC'S LIEN
AND CONSTRUCTION BOND CLAIMS.

The trial court's Judgment should be amended to include
an award of attorney fees and costs to Appellants for having
prevailed on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants
on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action.

7

(R. 127-28) . On

(...continued)
Pure Gas and Chemical Co. v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 993 (Wyo. 1974)
(Error to grant post-judgment interest from the date of the
verdict, rather than the date judgment was entered).
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September 12, 1991, Appellants' counsel filed an Affidavit of
Attorneys'

Fees and Costs

in which he

represented

that the

reasonable value of his service in bringing the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was $2,137.50.

(R. 111-12). Appellants' counsel

contended that it should be awarded attorney fees under both the
Mechanic's Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, and under the
Construction Bond Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3).
112; 123) .

(R. 62;

Appellee objected to the amount of attorney fees as

being unreasonable, but did not contend that attorney fees should
not be awarded.

(R. 117) .

In its Order of Partial Summary

Judgment, the court reserved the issue of Appellants' request for
attorney fees and costs for future determination.
In their

Proposed

Judgment, without

(R. 128).
specifying

the

amount, Appellants proposed that a reasonable attorney fee be
awarded.

(R. 194). Appellants again requested attorney fees and

costs at the Hearing on Proposed Findings and Judgment which took
place on August 28, 1992.

(R. 300, Reporter's Transcript of

Hearing on Defendant's Proposed Findings and Judgment, at p. 20).
Appellee objected to awarding Appellants the amount of
$2,137.50, pointing out that "the court has never determined the
amount of such fees, which amount needs to be determined by the
Court."

(R. 205)

The trial court never did determine the

appropriate amount.

Ultimately, it denied attorney fees and costs
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attributable to Appellants' successful Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

(R. 221).
The section of the Mechanics' Lien Statute addressing

attorney fees provides as follows:
In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney
fee# to be fixed by the Court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992) (emphasis added).

While a court

may have considerable discretion in determining the amount of
fees,8 neither the statute nor the case law suggest that a court
has discretion to deny attorney fees altogether.
There are two requirements for recovering fees under the
statute.
lien.

First, the action must be one to "enforce" a mechanic's

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18; Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 716

(Utah App. 1988) . Utah courts have held that an action seeking a
determination of priority and an order of foreclosure and sale
under the lien is an "action to enforce" the lien for purposes of
the statute. Nu-Trend Electric. Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah App. 1990).

8

In

See, e.g.. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1988) (setting out general principles and practical guidelines by which a court may determine the appropriate amount of
attorneys' fees in mechanic's lien cases).
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the present case, Appellee sought exactly that: a determination of
priority and an order of foreclosure under the mechanic's lien.
The only other requirement for entitlement to attorney
fees under the statute is that the party seeking the fees must be
"the successful party."

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18.

A party that

successfully defends against enforcement of the lien is "the successful party" and entitled to attorney fees.
Builders. 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (Utah 1969).

Palombi v. D&C

In the present case,

Appellants successfully defended against enforcement of the lien.
As the successful party in an action to enforce the mechanic's
lien, Appellants were entitled to recover a reasonable attorney fee
as a matter of law.
Under the Construction Bond Statute, fees and costs may
be awarded to the prevailing party at the discretion of the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3).

Counsel stated in his Response to

[Appellee's] Objection to Proposed [Summary] Judgment, that the
"majority of [his] time was spent on the mechanic's lien arguments
(which includes the Bond law argument as the two are practically
identical)."

(R. 123). As discussed above, the trial court failed

to determine and award reasonable fees and costs to Appellants for
prevailing on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
mechanic's lien claim.

The matter should be remanded for that

determination. At the same time, the trial court should determine
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whether an award of fees for the "Bond law" argument are appropriate.
XI.

CONCLUSION

There was no legal basis for the award of damages in this
case. The trial court fashioned a hybrid remedy based on contract
and in quantum meruit and, in doing so, it erred with respect to
both theories of law.

In basing the award on the contract, it

allowed the breaching party to recover from the nonbreaching party.
Basing it on a theory of unjust enrichment, it allowed recovery in
the face of a valid contract and without proof that Appellants had
been enriched by Appellee's efforts.

Under either theory, the

result is reversible error.
The trial

court also erred

in awarding prejudgment

interest on an unliquidated amount, and post-judgment interest from
a point in time nearly six months before judgment was entered. The
law with respect to prejudgment and post-judgment interest is
straightforward and Appellants had briefed it in connection with
their Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.

The trial court

apparently ignored the law to reach a result it desired.

The same

is true with respect to Appellants' application for attorney fees.
The trial court ignored Appellants' numerous requests for fees that
were mandated by statute and for fees that were discretionary with
the court.
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Finally, acting

contrary

-40-

to law, it denied the

mandatory fees, and failed to rule on whether a discretionary award
of fees was appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should vacate the
award of damages to Appellee; vacate the award of prejudgment and
post-judgment interest to Appellee; and remand the case to the
trial court and instruct it to award Appellants their reasonable
attorney fees and costs for prevailing on their Motion for Summary
Judgment on Appellee's Third and Fourth Causes of Action.
DATED this Z^

day of June, 1993.

fri>Tjf0P1

SPENCER E
ITSTIN
WILLIAM ()r # B^\ fANS

inn

of and T o r

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
SS,

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
WILLIAM J. EVANS, being duly sworn says that he is
employed in the law offices of PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER, attorneys
for Appellants, that he has this day served four copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT and a copy of this Affidavit of
Service by United States Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested,
to each of the following at the respective addresses shown below:
Bruce J. Nelson
Allen Hardy & Rasmussen
215 S. State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated at Salt Lake Ci

tah th>6N,^^ day of June,

1993.

Subscribed and sworn to £e£0xe me this
day of June, 1993
I, OJL AH/PUBLIC
JOYCE J. POLLARD
201 South Main #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

My Commission Expires
Marctt 8,1997
STATE OF UTAH

sCX^
NOTOkRY P U B L I C
Residing
at:

My Commission Expires:
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XI. ADDENDUM

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judgment
Construction Contract
Determinative Rules and Statutes
1.
2.
3.
4.

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (1992)
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 (1992)
Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992)
Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992)

ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM A

i< 1 L E D
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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Clerk of Summit County
BY...
Deputy Clerl
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
John Does 1 through 10,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 10870

)

* * * * * * * *

This action, having been tried to the Court, and the
Court, having considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties intended to and

did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act

000214

as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of
defendants1 residence in Park City, Utah.
2.
ties provided

The Court finds that the contract between the parthat plaintiff

would

complete

construction on

defendants1 residence within one year and, in return, defendant
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintiff's services in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00
per hour for plaintiff's own hands-on labor.
3.

The Court finds that plaintiff was aware that

defendants had experienced problems with prior general contractors and had terminated two general contractors for unsatisfactory performance.

Plaintiff was also aware that Mr. Kurzet was a

meticulous and demanding individual and would require exacting
performance of the contract.
4.

The Court finds the parties intended and the con-

tract provided for plaintiff, within 10 days after entering into
the contract, to provide defendants with evidence of adequate
liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the contract.
5.

The Court

finds that plaintiff

represented

to

defendants that plaintiff had $1 million in liability insurance
coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the contract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted $4-5 million in
coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered its policy was only
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for $300,000 coverage and that it had been cancelled on October
24, 1989.

6.

The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20,

1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Michael
Kent, defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage
and that defendants required such evidence under the terms of the
contract.
7.

The court find that defendants terminated plain-

tiffs services on October 2, 1990.
8.

The Court finds, that about 10% of the construc-

tion project was completed while plaintiff was general contractor
and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from
plaintiff's pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000
regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties under the
contract.
9.

The Court finds that defendants realized a benefit

of $5,500 which represents the amount saved by defendants through
plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of
lumber.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the subject contract was

ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that the Court has a
responsibility to add to it and to look upon it as an oral contract between the parties.
2.

The Court

concludes

that

the contract

can be

interpreted as written.
3.

The Court concludes that given the amount of the

subject contract and the cost of the construction, plaintiff had
a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for
the project, but did not.
4.

The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to

promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a
material breach of the contract.
5.

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

in terminating plaintiff's services for plaintiff's breach of its
obligation to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability
insurance.
6.

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

in terminating plaintiff's services because plaintiff spent very
few hours on the job site and did not give the construction
project the attention that it required under the contract and
that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect.
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7.

The Court concludes that defendants are not in

breach of the contract in any way.
8.

With

respect

to

plaintiff's

Unjust

Enrichment

Claim, the Court has considered several alternative methods of
calculating any award to plaintiff under such a theory.

The

Court concludes the most logical basis to be the percentage of
defendants1 residence that was completed during the period plaintiff was on the job.
9.

The Court rejects plaintiff's proposal that it

should receive 1/4 or $25,000, of the $100,000 consideration contemplated under the contract because it spent three months on the
job, or one quarter, of the one-year period for constructing the
residence as contemplated under the contract.

The Court finds

that such a proposal is unreasonable and unsupported by the
facts.
10.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to

receive $15,500 from defendant in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff and defendants,
$10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for
services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber.
11.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendant for the sum of $1,800 which represents defendants'
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costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants'
east side retaining wall.
12.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendants in the amount of $2,000 which represents defendants'
costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants'
west side concrete steps.
13.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendants in the amount of $559, which represents defendants'
costs for plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary Glu-Lam beams.
14.

The

Court

concludes

plaintiff

is

entitled

to

pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum,
from November 1, 1990, the date defendants terminated plaintiff's
services, to April 17, 1992, the date this Court granted plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Compel

Filing

of

Findings

of

Fact,

and

post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after April 17, 1992.
DATED this

^

day of

O&t

» , 1992.

BY THE COURT:

HOMER WILKINSON
District Court Judge fo'c

UJCE J. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff

"'"''

'''**OMIIII!»*»?1
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ADDENDUM B

ADDENDUM B

liLED

SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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Clerk o* Summit County.
BY.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs,
STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
John Does 1 through 10,

Civil No. 10870

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

This action came on for trial before the Court, the
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, presiding, and the
issues, having been duly tried to the Court, and the Court having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That plaintiff recover from defendants in quantum

meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff
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and defendants, the amount of $11,141.00, with interest thereon
at the legal rate provided by law in accordance with paragraph 4
below, which represents $10,000 for services rendered in directing and supervising l/10th of the construction of defendants'
residence, and $5,500 for plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber, adjusted by applying as an offset the following awards to defendants:
a.

The sum of $1,800 which represents defen-

dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's

faulty construction of

defendants' east side retaining wall;
b.

The sum of $2,000 which represents defen-

dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's

faulty construction of

defendants' west side concrete steps; and
c.

The sum of $559 which represents defendants'

costs caused by plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary materials;
2.

That defendants are not entitled to attorneys'

fees and costs attributable to defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;
3.

That plaintiff is awarded $542.40 as its costs of

court itemized as follows :
a.

Filing fee, $75,00;

b.

Service of process fees, $32.25;

c.

Kurzet deposition; $311.15;

-2-
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4.

d.

Bailey/Kent depositions, $99.00; and

e.

Expert witness fee, $25.00.

That plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment inter-

est on $11,141.00 at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum for
the

period

from

November

1,

1990

to April

17,

1992, and

post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after April 17, 1992; and
5.

That

defendants

counterclaims

are hereby dis-

missed with prejudice.
^

DATED this

. 1992.

day of
BY THE COURT:

/

X**mxi**>

•

HOMER WILKINSON
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

^C

>v>

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

',. CCUATY
BRUCE J. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
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A G R E E M E N T
This Agreement covers all of the understandings existing
between BAILEY-ALLEN (Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of the EVERGREEN
development at DEER VALLEY, PARK CITY, UTAH.
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a cost plus fixed fee
basis. Costs shall be billed monthly and payment shall be made
within ten days of receipt of billing. The fee fixed for this
contract is set at $100,000 for the residence as depicted in the
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in directed additional work, if
any. Any directed additional work in excess of an aggregate cost
of $50,000 will result in additional fees based on 7% of the cost
of such additional work.
All billing incorporating costs involving subcontractors or
suppliers will be supported by copies of invoices clearly showing
that the services were performed and/or materials delivered at the
job site and shall further carry the notation by Contractor that
the billing is true and correct.
In the event that Owner's absence from Park City would result
in failing to pay Contractor in a timely manner as set forth above,
Contractor may Fax the billing to Owner and Owner shall cause
payment to by made by express mail or electronic transfer directly
to Contractor's account, however, when such payment is made, Owner
reserves the right to review and obtain adjustment if indicated
pending the opportunity to review the records and work performed
upon Owner's return.
Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that this contract cannot
be changed except and unless in writing, bearing the date and
signatures of both parties.
The residence shall be constructed in accordance with the
drawings and no change will be made without the express written
consent of Owner. All changes will be covered by a written Change
Order in the form of EXHIBIT A attached hereto, describing the
nature of the change, the resulting differential in costs and the
impact on completion schedule if any and be dated and approved by
both Owner and Contractor.
The work is to be performed in accordance with a schedule
prepared by Contractor and the structure completed by April 15,
1991 and a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy shall have been
obtained by that date. The only Item permissible to be outstanding
on the TCO is landscaping. A schedule in the general form of
Exhibit B, prepared by Contractor shall be the definitive document
for assessing whether work is or is not progressing on schedule.
The residence

was designed through the cooperative effort of
1
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Mark Walker, the Architect and Owner. Any questions pertaining to
the structure should be directed to Mark Walker or his associate,
Stan Johnson. If the architect fails to respond and such continued
failure will cause increased construction costs, Owner is to be
notified at the earliest possible moment so that he has the
opportunity to mitigate such costs. The Owner shall not be liable
for increased costs occasioned by such delays in response or
recovery from drawing or design errors where the Contractor failed
to notify Owner before the increased costs were so incurred.
The Owner will have review authority and right of refusal on
subcontracts and material purchases. The Contractor will obtain
competitive bids for services and materials in sufficient time to
permit a review of a maximum of one week duration by Owner and if
necessary, select an alternative supplier without impact on
schedule or cost. Every effort will be made by the Contractor to
locate, solicit and select suppliers sufficiently in advance of
need to prevent the forced acceptance of an uneconomic bid because
a delay would be as costly or more costly than the loss arising
from the uneconomic bid. All bids will provide sufficient detail
to permit an intelligent analysis of the value of such bid. Time
and material bids will at minimum state the proposed hourly rates
for each category of labor and the percentage of fees and all other
costs to be passed on to Owner for labor and material. Both fixed
price and T&M bids will adequately identify the materials to be
provided as to quantity, type, grade, model and manufacturer as
applicable.
The Owner's review authority notwithstanding, the Contractor
is fully responsible to Owner for the performance of
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs occasioned by the failure of a
subcontractor to perform shall not be assessable to Owner.
The Contractor shall carry insurance specifically providing for
saving Owner harmless from any action arising due to the injury of
a worker even if an employ of a subcontractor or supplier who is
not properly or adequately insured. Contractor shall, within 10
days of the date of this agreement furnish a Certificate of
Insurance prepared by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The
Certificate shall specifically state the purpose and limits of the
policy and these shall show that the work to be performed under
this contract is covered.
Owner specifically states and Contractor acknowledges that
Owner and only Owner is empowered to direct the Contractor to incur
cost unforeseen by the plans and specifications that are in excess
of an aggregate of $1,000 (one thousand Dollars) for any given
category. A category is defined as a class of event such as work
performed in accordance with a plan error that must be corrected,
or need to perform additional work as a result of inclement
weather, or rework directed by the City Inspector and similarly
reasonably unforseeable events. Accordingly, any costs arising
from the performance of a directive from any person whomsoever
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other than Owner which are in excess of the $1,000 aggregate per
category limit, will not be reimbursable under this agreement.
Therefore, in order for cost arising from any ordered changes or
rework to be reimbursable to Contractor, such work must be
described and authorized in writing. However, the Owner will not
unreasonably withhold approval for any proposed additional work
which may in the opinion of Architect, Contractor, Inspector,
Engineer, members of Owner's family or others be deemed necessary
or desirable.
The Contractor warrants that the residence will be free of of
defects in workmanship and materials and shall, at no expense to
Owner, correct any such defect for a period of one year from the
date of the Temporary Certificate of Occupancy. The Contractor's
liability in this regard specifically extends to consequential
damage as may occur as a direct result of such deficiency in
workmanship, and material. The Contractor's warranty liability
does not extend to work performed or materials provided by Owner or
to any consequence arrising therefrom.
Contractor takes note that Owner is concerned about the
quality of workmanship and materials and that this concern stems
from prior experience with a local contractor and ownership of
several condominiums at the Pinnacle development. Owner will not
make unreasonable demands, however, slovenly workmanship and/or
substandard materials will neither be accepted or paid for by
Owner. Owner considers that the fees he pays to Contractor are
specifically for his expertise in selecting and supervising workers
so as to avoid unacceptable and substandard workmanship and/or the
use of substandard quality materials.
Both Owner and Contractor stipulate that time is of the
essence and both will make every effort to reach the other as
expeditiously as possible. The Owner and Contractor can be
contacted as set forth in Exhibit C.
In the event Owner will not be at either of these locations,
Owner will leave or fax a schedule indicating where he can be
reached on any given day.
In the event Contractor is not available, he shall leave word
as to who is authorized to act for Contractor.
Entered into this Third Day Of July, 1990 at Park City, Utah.

y?
/
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CONTRACTOR
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OWNER

EXHIBIT A
C H A N G E

O R D E R

In connection with the construction of the Kurzet residence on Lot
#4 Evergreen, Mountainland Builders is hereby authorized to perform
the following specific work and to supply the materials and
services as needed for such performance.
WORK DESCRIPTION

UNDERSTANDINGS
The cost differential of the above described work shall be:

The affect on schedule of the described work shall be:

APPROVALS

CONTRACTOR

DATE

OWNER

4
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DATE

-—-^_
ACTIVITY

MONTH
^ — ^ _

MAY

APR
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JUL

AUG

OCT

SEP

NOV
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JAN
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EXHIBIT B- -PAGE 5 - -PROJECT PLANNING DOCUMENT, (PPD)

EXHIBIT C
TO CONTACT CONTRACTOR
Office:

P.O. Box 11074
Salt Lake City, UT
84147

Richard Allen

Tel. 801-973-7888

Michael Kent

801-466-4169

Park City Mobil

645-8450..1118

Salt Lake Mobil

534-0429.. 113.8

Work Site

TBD

Jeremy Ranch

645-8449

TO CONTACT OWNER
Park City:

Tel. 645-9269
Fax 645-8622
Mobile 801-573-4453
PO Box 680670
1250 Pinnacle Drive
Park City, UT 68048

Oregon Ranch:

Tel. 503-888-9269
Fax 503-888-6055
PO Box 5039
Charleston Station
Charleston, OR 97420

Tahiti

Box Postal 21164
Papeete
French Polynesia

Direct dial
from USA

011-689-532-235

Aircraft:

Direct Dial 402-931-1124

Mobile:

801-573-4453
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ADDENDUM D

ADDENDUM D.l
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (1992)

(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)

ADDENDUM D.2
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 (1992)

Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date
the judgment was entered in the trial court.

ADDENDUM D J
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992)

14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment
bond — Liability.
(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond
is liable to each person who performed labor or service or supplied equipment or materials under the
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed or the equipment or materials furnished up to but not exceeding the contract price.
(2) No action to recover on this liability may be
commenced after the expiration of one year after the
day on which the last of the labor or service was performed or the equipment or material was supplied by
the person.
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs in
the action.
1989

ADDENDUM D.4
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992)

38-1-18. Attorneys* fees.
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 1961

